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Abstract. We study simple type theory with primitive equality (STT) and its first-order
fragment EFO, which restricts equality and quantification to base types but retains lambda
abstraction and higher-order variables. As deductive system we employ a cut-free tableau
calculus. We consider completeness, compactness, and existence of countable models. We
prove these properties for STT with respect to Henkin models and for EFO with respect
to standard models. We also show that the tableau system yields a decision procedure for
three EFO fragments.
1. Introduction
Church’s type theory [16] is a basic formulation of higher-order logic. Henkin [18]
found a natural class of models for which Church’s Hilbert-style proof system turned out
to be complete. Equality, originally expressed with higher-order quantification, was later
identified as the primary primitive of the theory [19, 3, 1]. In this paper we consider simple
type theory with primitive equality but without descriptions or choice. We call this system
STT for simple type theory. The semantics of STT is given by Henkin models with equality.
Modern proof theory started with Gentzen’s [17] invention of a cut-free sequent calcu-
lus for first-order logic. While Gentzen proved a cut-elimination theorem for his calculus,
Smullyan [25] found an elegant technique (abstract consistency classes) for proving the
completeness of cut-free first-order calculi. Smullyan [25] found it advantageous to work
with a refutation-oriented variant of Gentzen’s sequent calculi [17] known as tableau cal-
culi [10, 20, 25].
The development of complete cut-free proof systems for simple type theory turned out
to be hard. In 1953, Takeuti [30] introduced a sequent calculus for a version of simple
type theory without primitive equality and conjectured that cut elimination holds for this
calculus. Gentzen’s [17] inductive proof of cut-elimination for first-order sequent calculi does
not generalize to the higher-order case since instances of formulas may be more complex than
the formula itself. Moreover, Henkin’s [18] completeness proof cannot be adapted for cut-
free systems. Takeuti’s conjecture was answered positively by Tait [27] for second-order
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logic, by Takahashi [28] and Prawitz [24] for higher-order logic without extensionality, and
by Takahashi [29] for higher-order logic with extensionality. Building on the possible-values
technique of Takahashi [28] and Prawitz [24], Takeuti [31] finally proves Henkin completeness
of a cut-free sequent calculus with extensionality.
The first cut-elimination result for a calculus similar to Church’s type theory was ob-
tained by Andrews [2] in 1971. Andrews considers elementary type theory (Church’s type
theory without equality, extensionality, infinity, and choice) and proves that a cut-free se-
quent calculus is complete relative to a Hilbert-style proof system. Andrews’ proof employs
both the possible-values technique [28, 24] and the abstract consistency technique [25]. In
2004 Benzmüller, Brown and Kohlhase [7] gave a completeness proof for an extensional cut-
free sequent calculus. The constructions in [7] also employ abstract consistency and possible
values.
None of the cut-free calculi discussed above has equality as a primitive. Following Leib-
niz, one can define equality of a and b to hold whenever a and b satisfy the same properties.
While this yields equality in standard models (full function spaces), there are Henkin models
where this is not the case as was shown by Andrews [3]. A particularly disturbing fact about
the model Andrews constructs is that while it is extensional (indeed, it is a Henkin model), it
does not satisfy a formula corresponding to extensionality (formulated using Leibniz equal-
ity). In [3] Andrews gives a definition of a general model which is essentially a Henkin model
with equality. This notion of a general model was generalized to include non-extensional
models in [6] and a condition called property q was explicitly included to ensure Leibniz
equality is the same as semantic equality. The constructions of Prawitz, Takahashi, An-
drews and Takeuti described above do not produce models guaranteed to satisfy property q.
A similar generalization of Henkin models to non-extensional models is given by Muskens [23]
but without a condition like property q. Muskens uses the Prawitz-Takahashi method to
prove completeness of a cut-free sequent calculus for a formulation of elementary type theory
via a model existence theorem, again producing a model in which Leibniz equality may not
be the same as semantic equality. The models constructed in [6] do satisfy property q, as
do the models constructed in [7].
In addition to the model-theoretic complication, defined equality also destroys the cut-
freeness of a proof system. As shown in [8] any use of Leibniz equality to say two terms
are equal provides for the simulation of cut.1 Hence calculi that define equality as Leibniz
equality cannot claim to provide cut-free equational reasoning. In the context of resolution,
Benzmüller gives serious consideration to primitive equality and its relationship to Leibniz
equality in his 1999 doctoral thesis [4] (see also [5]). The completeness proofs there are
relative to an assumption that corresponds to cut.
The first completeness proof for a cut-free proof system for extensional simple type
theory with primitive equality relative to Henkin models was given by Brown in his 2004
doctoral thesis [12] (later published as a book [13]). Brown proves the Henkin completeness
of a novel one-sided sequent calculus with primitive equality. His model construction starts
with Andrews’ [2] non-extensional possible-values relations and then obtains a structure
isomorphic to a Henkin model by taking a quotient with respect to a partial equivalence
relation. Finally, abstract consistency classes [25, 2] are used to obtain the completeness
result. The equality-based decomposition rules of Brown’s sequent calculus have common-
alities with the unification rules of the systems of Kohlhase [22] and Benzmüller [5]. Note,
1From a Leibniz formula of the form ∀p.ps → pt one can easily infer u → u for any formula u, and then
use u as a formula introduced by cut.
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however, that the completeness proofs of Kohlhase and Benzmüller assume the presence of
cut.
In this paper we improve and simplify Brown’s result [13]. For the proof system we
switch to a cut-free tableau calculus T that employs an abstract normalization operator.
With the normalization operator we hide the details of lambda conversion from the tableau
calculus and most of the completeness proof. For the completeness proof we use the new
notion of a value system to directly construct surjective Henkin models. Value systems are
logical relations [26] providing a relational semantics for simply-typed lambda calculus. The
inspiration for value systems came from the possible-values relations used in [13, 15, 14].
In contrast to Henkin models, which obtain values for terms by induction on terms, value
systems obtain values for terms by induction on types. Induction on types, which is crucial
for our proofs, has the advantage of hiding the presence of the lambda binder. As a result,
only a single lemma of our completeness proof deals explicitly with lambda abstractions and
substitutions.
Once we have established the results for STT, we turn to its first-order fragment EFO
(for extended first-order), which restricts equality and quantification to base types but re-
tains lambda abstraction and higher-order variables. EFO contains the usual first-order
formulas but also contains formulas that are not first-order in the traditional sense. For in-
stance, a formula p(λx.¬fx) is EFO even though the predicate p is applied to a λ-abstraction
and the negation appears embedded in a nontrivial way. We sharpen the results for STT by
proving that they hold for EFO with respect to standard models and for a constrained rule
for the universal quantifier (first published in [14]).
Finally, we consider three decidable fragments of EFO: the lambda-free fragment, the
pure fragment (disequations between simply typed λ-terms not involving logic), and the
Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey fragment. For each of these fragments, decidability follows
from termination of the tableau calculus for EFO (first published in [15] and [14]).
2. Basic Definitions
We assume a countable set of base types (β). Types (σ, τ , µ) are defined inductively:
(1) every base type is a type; (2) if σ and τ are types, then στ is a type. We assume a
countable set of names (x, y), where every name comes with a unique type, and where for
every type there are infinitely many names of this type.2 Terms (s, t, u, v) are defined
inductively: (1) every name is a term; (2) if s is a term of type τµ and t is a term of type
τ , then st is a term of type µ; (3) if x is a name of type σ and t is a term of type τ , then
λx.t is a term of type στ . We write s : σ to say that s is a term of type σ. Moreover, we
write Λσ for the set of all terms of type σ. We assume that the set of types and the set of
terms are disjoint.
A frame is a function D that maps every type to a nonempty set such that D(στ) is
a set of total functions from Dσ to Dτ for all types σ, τ (i.e., D(στ) ⊆ (Dσ → Dτ)). An
assignment into a frame D is a function I that extends D (i.e., D ⊆ I) and maps every
name x : σ to an element of Dσ (i.e., Ix ∈ Dσ). If I is an assignment into a frame D,
x : σ is a name, and a ∈ Dσ, then Ixa denotes the assignment into D that agrees everywhere
with I but possibly on x where it yields a. For every frame D we define a function ˆ that for
2Later we will partition names into variables and logical constants.
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every assignment I into D yields a function Iˆ that for some terms s : σ returns an element
of Dσ. The definition is by induction on terms.
Iˆx := Ix
Iˆ(st) := fa if Iˆs = f and Iˆt = a
Iˆ(λx.s) := f if λx.s : στ , f ∈ D(στ), and ∀a ∈ Dσ : Îxas = fa
We call Iˆ the evaluation function of I . The evaluation function may be partial since in the
last clause of the definition even assuming there is some function f such that Îxas = fa for
every a ∈ Dσ, this f may not be in D(στ). In such a case, Iˆ will not be defined on λx.s.
Of course, in such a case Iˆ will also not be defined on a term of the form (λx.s)t since the
second clause of the definition will fail. An interpretation is an assignment whose evaluation
function is defined on all terms. An assignment I is surjective if for every type σ and every
value a ∈ Iσ there exists a term s : σ such that Iˆs = a.
Proposition 2.1. Let I be an interpretation, x : σ, and a ∈ Iσ. Then Ixa is an interpreta-
tion.
Proposition 2.2. If I is a surjective interpretation, then Iσ is a countable set for every
type σ.
A standard frame is a frame D such that D(στ) = (Dσ → Dτ) for all types σ, τ . A
standard interpretation is an assignment into a standard frame. Note that every standard
interpretation is, in fact, an interpretation.
We assume a normalization operator [·] that provides for lambda conversion. The nor-
malization operator [·] must be a type preserving total function from terms to terms. We
call [s] the normal form of s and say that s is normal if [s] = s. One possible normalization
operator is a function that for every term s return a β-normal term that can be obtained
from s by β-reduction. We will not commit to a particular normalization operator but
state explicitly the properties we require for our results. To start, we require the following
properties:
N1 : [[s]] = [s]
N2 : [[s]t] = [st]
N3 : [xs1 . . . sn] = x[s1] . . . [sn] if xs1 . . . sn : β and n ≥ 0
N4 : Iˆ[s] = Iˆs if I is an interpretation
Proposition 2.3. xs1 . . . sn : β is normal iff s1, . . . , sn are normal.
For the proofs of Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.4 we need further properties of the nor-
malization operator that can only be expressed with substitutions. A substitution is a type
preserving partial function from names to terms. If θ is a substitution, x is a name, and s is
a term that has the same type as x, we write θxs for the substitution that agrees everywhere
with θ but possibly on x where it yields s. We assume that every substitution θ can be
extended to a type preserving total function θˆ from terms to terms such that the following
conditions hold:
S1 : θˆx = if x ∈ Dom θ then θx else x
S2 : θˆ(st) = (θˆs)(θˆt)
S3 : [(θˆ(λx.s))t] = [θ̂xt s]
S4 : [∅ˆs] = [s]
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Note that ∅ (the empty set) is the substitution that is undefined on every name.
3. Value Systems
We introduce value systems as a tool for constructing surjective interpretations. Value
systems are logical relations inspired by the possible-values relations used in [13, 14, 15].
A value system is a function ⊲ that maps every base type β to a binary relation ⊲β such
that Dom(⊲β) ⊆ Λβ and s ⊲β a iff [s] ⊲β a. For every value system ⊲ we define by induction
on types:
Dσ := Ran (⊲σ)
⊲στ := { (s, f) ∈ Λστ × (Dσ → Dτ) | ∀(t, a) ∈ ⊲σ : (st, fa) ∈ ⊲τ }
Note that D(στ) ⊆ (Dσ → Dτ) for all types στ . We usually drop the type index in s ⊲σ a
and read s ⊲ a as s can be a or a is a possible value for s.
Proposition 3.1. For every value system: s ⊲σ a iff [s] ⊲σ a.
Proof. By induction on σ. For base types the claim holds by the definition of value systems.
Let σ = τµ. For all s ∈ Λσ, t ∈ Λτ , a ∈ Dτ → Dµ, and b ∈ Dτ ,
st ⊲µ ab iff [st] ⊲µ ab iff [[s]t] ⊲µ ab iff [s]t ⊲µ ab
by the inductive hypothesis and N2. Hence s ⊲σ a iff [s] ⊲ a.
A value system ⊲ is functional if ⊲β is a functional relation for every base type β. (That
is, for each s ∈ Λβ there is at most one b such that s ⊲ b.)
Proposition 3.2. If ⊲ is functional, then ⊲σ is a functional relation for every type σ.
Proof. By induction on σ. For σ = β, the claim is trivial. Let σ = τµ and s ⊲τµ f, g. We
show f = g. Let a ∈ Dτ . Then t ⊲τ a for some t. Now st ⊲µ fa, ga. By inductive hypothesis
fa = ga.
A value system ⊲ is total if x ∈ Dom ⊲σ for every name x : σ. An assignment I is
admissible for a value system ⊲ if Iσ = Dσ for all types σ and x ⊲ Ix for all names x.
(Recall that ⊲ is used to define D.) Note that every total value system has admissible
assignments. We will show that admissible assignments are interpretations that evaluate
terms to possible values.
Lemma 3.3. Let I be an assignment that is admissible for a value system ⊲ and θ be a
substitution such that θx ⊲ Ix for all x ∈ Dom θ. Then s ∈ Dom Iˆ and θˆs ⊲ Iˆs for every
term s.
Proof. By induction on s. Let s be a term. Case analysis.
s = x. The claim holds by assumption and S1.
s = tu. Then t ∈ Dom Iˆ, θˆt ⊲ Iˆt, u ∈ Dom Iˆ, and θˆu ⊲ Iˆu by inductive hypothesis. Thus
s ∈ Dom Iˆ and θˆs = (θˆt)(θˆu) ⊲ (Iˆt)(Iˆu) = Iˆs using S2.
s = λx.t, x : σ and t : τ . We need to prove s ∈ Dom Iˆ and θˆs ⊲ Iˆs. First we prove
t ∈ Dom Îxa and (θˆs)u ⊲ Î
x
at whenever u ⊲σ a. (3.1)
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Let u ⊲σ a. By inductive hypothesis we have t ∈ Dom Îxa and θ̂
x
ut ⊲ Î
x
at. Now [(θˆs)u] =
[θ̂xut] ⊲ Î
x
at using S3. Using Proposition 3.1 we conclude (3.1) holds.
By definition of Dσ for every a ∈ Dσ there is a u such that u ⊲ a. Using this and (3.1)
we know t ∈ Dom Îxa for every a ∈ Dσ. Let f : Dσ → Dτ be defined by fa = Î
x
at for each
a ∈ Iσ. For all u ⊲σ a we have (θˆs)u ⊲ fa by (3.1). Hence θˆs ⊲ f . This implies f ∈ D(στ),
s ∈ Dom Iˆ, Iˆs = f and θˆs ⊲ Iˆs as desired.
Theorem 3.4. Let I be an assignment that is admissible for a value system ⊲. Then I is an
interpretation such that s⊲ Iˆs for all terms s. Furthermore, I is surjective if ⊲ is functional.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 3.3 with Proposition 3.1 and S4. To prove the second claim, let
a ∈ Dσ be given. By definition of D there is some s such that s ⊲ a. Since s ⊲ Iˆs we know
Iˆs = a by Proposition 3.2.
4. Simple Type Theory
We now define the terms and semantics of simple type theory (STT ). We fix a base
type o for the truth values and a name ¬ : oo for negation. Moreover, we fix for every type
σ a name =σ: σσo for the identity predicate for σ. An assignment I is logical if Io = {0, 1},
I(¬) is the negation function and I(=σ) is the identity predicate for σ. We refer to the base
types different from o as sorts, to the names ¬ and =σ as logical constants, and to all other
names as variables. From now on x will range over variables. Moreover, c will range over
logical constants and α will range over sorts.
A formula is a term of type o. We employ infix notation for formulas obtained with =σ
and often write equations s =σ t without the type index. We write s 6= t for ¬(s=t) and
speak of a disequation. Note that quantified formulas ∀x.s can be expressed as equations
(λx.s) = (λx.x = x).
A logical interpretation I satisfies a formula s if Iˆs = 1. A model of a set of formulas A
is a logical interpretation that satisfies every formula s ∈ A. A set of formulas is satisfiable
if it has a model.
5. Tableau Calculus
We now give a deductive calculus for STT. A branch is a set of normal formulas. The
tableau calculus T operates on finite branches and employs the rules shown in Figure 1. The
side condition “x fresh” of rule Tfe requires that x does not occur free in the branch the
rule is applied to. We say a branch A is closed if x,¬x ∈ A for some variable x : o or if
x 6=ι x ∈ A for some variable x : ι. Note that A is closed if and only if either the Tmat or
Tdec rule applies with n = 0. We impose the following restrictions:
(1) We only admit rule instances A/A1 . . . An where A is not closed.
(2) Tfe can only be applied to a disequation (s 6=t) ∈ A if there is no variable x such that
([sx] 6= [tx]) ∈ A.
The set of refutable branches is defined inductively: if A/A1 . . . An is an instance of a rule
of T and A1, . . . , An are refutable, then A is refutable. Note that the base cases of this
inductive definition are when n = 0. The rules where n may be 0 are Tmat and Tdec.
Figure 2 shows a refutation in T .
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T¬¬
¬¬s
s
Tbq
s =o t
s , t | ¬s , ¬t
Tbe
s 6=o t
s , ¬t | ¬s , t
Tfq
s =στ t
[su] = [tu]
u : σ normal Tfe
s 6=στ t
[sx] 6= [tx]
x : σ fresh
Tmat
xs1 . . . sn , ¬xt1 . . . tn
s1 6= t1 | · · · | sn 6= tn
n ≥ 0 Tdec
xs1 . . . sn 6=α xt1 . . . tn
s1 6= t1 | · · · | sn 6= tn
n ≥ 0
Tcon
s =α t , u 6=α v
s 6= u , t 6= u | s 6= v , t 6= v
Figure 1: Tableau rules for STT
pf, ¬p(λx.¬¬fx)
[Tmat]
f 6= (λx.¬¬fx)
[Tfe]
fx 6= ¬¬fx
[Tbe]
fx, ¬¬¬fx
[T¬¬]
¬fx
[Tmat]
x 6= x
[Tdec]
¬fx, ¬¬fx
[T¬¬]
fx
[Tmat]
x 6= x
[Tdec]
Figure 2: Tableau refuting {pf,¬p(λx.¬¬fx)} where p : (αo)o and f : αo
A remark on the names of the rules: Tmat is called the mating rule, Tdec the decom-
position rule, Tcon the confrontation rule, Tbq the Boolean equality rule, Tbe the Boolean
extensionality rule, Tfq the functional equality rule, and Tfe the functional extensionality
rule.
Proposition 5.1 (Soundness). Every refutable branch is unsatisfiable.
Proof. Let A/A1 . . . An be an instance of a rule of T such that A is satisfiable. It suffices to
show that one of the branches A1, . . . , An is satisfiable. Straightforward.
We will show that the tableau calculus T is complete, that is, can refute every finite
unsatisfiable branch. The rules of T are designed such that we obtain a strong completeness
result. For practical purposes one can of course include rules that close branches including
s,¬s or s 6= s.
To avoid redundancy, our definition of STT only covers the logical constants ¬ and =σ.
Adding further constants such as ∧, ∨, →, ∀σ and ∃σ is straightforward. In fact, all logical
constants can be expressed with the identities =σ [1]. We have included ¬ since we need
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(λx.x) = λx.y
[Tfq with x]
x =o y
[Tbq]
x, y
[Tfq with ¬x]
(¬x) =o y
[Tbq]
¬x, y
[Tmat]
¬¬x,¬y
[Tmat]
¬x,¬y
[Tfq with ¬x]
(¬x) =o y
[Tbq]
¬x, y
[Tmat]
¬¬x,¬y
[T¬¬]
x
[Tmat]
Figure 3: Tableau refuting (λx.x) = λx.y where x, y : o
E¬¬ If ¬¬s is in E, then s is in E.
Ebq If s =o t is in E, then either s and t are in E or ¬s and ¬t are in E.
Ebe If s 6=o t is in E, then either s and ¬t are in E or ¬s and t are in E.
Efq If s =στ t is in E, then [su] = [tu] is in E for every normal u : σ.
Efe If s 6=στ t is in E, then [sx] 6= [tx] is in E for some variable x.
Emat If xs1 . . . sn and ¬xt1 . . . tn are in E, then n ≥ 1 and si 6= ti is in E for
some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note that if n = 0, this means if ¬x ∈ E, then
x /∈ E.
Edec If xs1 . . . sn 6=α xt1 . . . tn is in E, then n ≥ 1 and si 6= ti is in E for
some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Note that if n = 0, this means x 6=α x /∈ E.
Econ If s =α t and u 6=α v are in E,
then either s 6= u and t 6= u are in E or s 6= v and t 6= v are in E.
Figure 4: Evidence conditions
it for the formulation of the tableau calculus. The refutation in Figure 3 suggests that the
elimination of ¬ is not straightforward.
6. Evidence
A branch E is evident if it satisfies the evidence conditions in Figure 4. The evidence
conditions correspond to the tableau rules and are designed such that every branch that is
closed under the tableau rules is either closed or evident. We will show that evident branches
are satisfiable.
A branch E is complete if for every normal formula s either s or ¬s is in E. The cut-
freeness of T shows in the fact that there are many evident sets that are not complete. For
instance, {pf, ¬p(λx.¬fx), f 6= λx.¬fx, fx 6= ¬fx, ¬fx} is an incomplete evident branch
if p : (σo)o.
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6.1. Discriminants. Given an evident branch E, we will construct a value system whose
admissible logical interpretations are models of E. We start by defining the values for the
sorts, which we call discriminants. Discriminants first appeared in [15].
Let E be a fixed evident branch in the following. A term u ∈ Λα is α-discriminating in
E if there is some term t such that either u 6=α t or t 6=α u is in E. An α-discriminant is a
maximal set a of discriminating terms of type α such that there is no disequation s 6=t ∈ E
such that s, t ∈ a. We write s♯t if E contains the disequation s 6=t or t 6=s.
In [12] a sort was interpreted using maximally compatible sets of terms of the sort
(where s and t are compatible unless s♯t). The idea is that the set E insists that certain
terms cannot be equal, but leaves open that other terms ultimately may be identified by the
interpretation. In particular, two compatible terms s and t may be identified by taking a
maximally compatible set of terms containing both s and t as a value. It is not difficult to see
that a maximally compatible set is simply the union of an α-discriminant with all terms of
sort α that are not α-discriminating. We now find that it is clearer to use α-discriminants as
values instead of maximally compatible sets. In particular, it is easier to count the number
of α-discriminants, as we now show.
Example 6.1. Suppose E = {x 6=y, x 6=z, y 6=z} and x, y, z : α. There are 3 α-discriminants:
{x}, {y}, {z}.
Example 6.2. Suppose E = { an 6=α bn | n ∈ N } where the an and bn are pairwise distinct
variables. Then E is evident and there are uncountably many α-discriminants.
Proposition 6.3. If E contains exactly n disequations at α, then there are at most 2n
α-discriminants. If E contains no disequation at α, then ∅ is the only α-discriminant.
Proposition 6.4. Let a and b be different discriminants. Then:
(1) a and b are separated by a disequation in E, that is, there exist terms s ∈ a and t ∈ b
such that s♯t.
(2) a and b are not connected by an equation in E, that is, there exist no terms s ∈ a and
t ∈ b such that (s=t) ∈ E.
Proof. The first claim follows by contradiction. Suppose there are no terms s ∈ a and t ∈ b
such that s♯t. Let s ∈ a. Then s ∈ b since b is a maximal set of discriminating terms. Thus
a ⊆ b and hence a = b since a is maximal. Contradiction.
The second claim also follows by contradiction. Suppose there is an equation (s1=s2) ∈
E such that s1 ∈ a and s2 ∈ b. By the first claim we have terms s ∈ a and t ∈ b such that
s♯t. By Econ we have s1♯s or s2♯t. Contradiction since a and b are discriminants.
6.2. Compatibility. For our proofs we need an auxiliary notion for evident branches that
we call compatibility. Let E be a fixed evident branch in the following. We define relations
‖σ⊆ Λσ × Λσ by induction on types:
s ‖o t :⇐⇒ {[s],¬[t]} 6⊆ E and {¬[s], [t]} 6⊆ E
s ‖α t :⇐⇒ not [s]♯[t]
s ‖στ t :⇐⇒ su ‖τ tv whenever u ‖σ v
We say that s and t are compatible if s ‖ t.
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Lemma 6.5 (Compatibility).
For n ≥ 0 and all terms s, t, xs1 . . . sn, xt1 . . . tn of type σ:
(1) We do not have both s ‖σ t and [s]♯[t].
(2) Either xs1 . . . sn ‖σ xt1 . . . tn or [si]♯[ti] for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. By induction on σ. Case analysis.
σ = o. Claim (1) follows with Ebe. Claim (2) follows with N3 and Emat.
σ = α. Claim (1) is trivial. Claim (2) follows with N3 and Edec.
σ = τµ. We show (1) by contradiction. Suppose s ‖σ t and [s]♯[t]. By Efe [[s]x]♯[[t]x] for
some variable x. By inductive hypothesis (2) we have x ‖τ x. Hence sx ‖µ tx. Contradiction
by inductive hypothesis (1) and N2.
To show (2), suppose xs1 . . . sn ∦σ xt1 . . . tn. Then there exist terms such that u ‖τ v
and xs1 . . . snu ∦µ xt1 . . . tnv. By inductive hypothesis (1) we know that [u]♯[v] does not
hold. Hence [si]♯[ti] for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} by inductive hypothesis (2).
7. Model Existence
Let E be a fixed evident branch. We define a value system ⊲ for E:
s ⊲o 0 :⇐⇒ s ∈ Λo and [s] /∈ E
s ⊲o 1 :⇐⇒ s ∈ Λo and ¬[s] /∈ E
s ⊲α a :⇐⇒ s ∈ Λα, a is an α-discriminant, and [s] ∈ a if [s] is discriminating
Note that N1 ensures the property s ⊲β a iff [s] ⊲β a.
Proposition 7.1. For all variables xo, either x ⊲ 0 and ¬x ⊲ 1 or x ⊲ 1 and ¬x ⊲ 0. In
particular, Do = {0, 1}.
Proof. By Emat either x /∈ E or ¬x /∈ E. If x /∈ E, then x ⊲ 0 and ¬x ⊲ 1 by N3 and E¬¬. If
¬x /∈ E, then x ⊲ 1 and ¬x ⊲ 0 by N3.
Lemma 7.2. A logical assignment is a model of E if it is admissible for ⊲.
Proof. Let I be a logical assignment that is admissible for ⊲, and let s ∈ E. By Theorem 3.4
we know that I is an interpretation and that s ⊲o Iˆs. Thus Iˆs 6= 0 since s ∈ E. Hence
Iˆs = 1.
It remains to show that ⊲ admits logical interpretations. First we show that all sets Dσ
are nonempty. To do so, we prove that compatible equi-typed terms have a common value.
A set T of equi-typed terms is compatible if s ‖ t for all terms s, t ∈ T . We write T ⊲σ a if
T ⊆ Λσ, a ∈ Dσ, and t ⊲ a for every t ∈ T .
Lemma 7.3 (Common Value). Let T ⊆ Λσ. Then T is compatible if and only if there exists
a value a such that T ⊲σ a.
Proof. By induction on σ.
σ = α, ⇒. Let T be compatible. Then there exists an α-discriminant a that contains all
the α-discriminating terms in { [t] | t ∈ T }. Clearly, T ⊲ a.
σ = α, ⇐. Suppose T ⊲ a and T is not compatible. Then there are terms s, t ∈ T such that
([s]6=[t]) ∈ E. Thus [s] and [t] cannot be both in a. This contradicts s, t ∈ T ⊲ a since [s]
and [t] are discriminating.
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σ = o, ⇒. By contraposition. Suppose T ⋫ 0 and T ⋫ 1. Then there are terms s, t ∈ T
such that [s],¬[t] ∈ E. Thus s ∦ t. Hence T is not compatible.
σ = o, ⇐. By contraposition. Suppose s ∦o t for s, t ∈ T . Then [s],¬[t] ∈ E without loss of
generality. Hence s ⋫ 0 and t ⋫ 1. Thus T ⋫ 0 and T ⋫ 1.
σ = τµ, ⇒. Let T be compatible. We define Ta := { ts | t ∈ T, s ⊲τ a } for every value
a ∈ Iτ and show that Ta is compatible. Let t1, t2 ∈ T and s1, s2 ⊲τ a. It suffices to show
t1s1 ‖ t2s2. By the inductive hypothesis s1 ‖τ s2. Since T is compatible, t1 ‖ t2. Hence
t1s1 ‖ t2s2.
By the inductive hypothesis we now know that for every a ∈ Iτ there is a b ∈ Iµ such
that Ta ⊲µ b. Hence there is a function f ∈ Iσ such that Ta ⊲µ fa for every a ∈ Iτ . Thus
T ⊲σ f .
σ = τµ, ⇐. Let T ⊲σ f and s, t ∈ T . We show s ‖σ t. Let u ‖τ v. It suffices to show
su ‖µ tv. By the inductive hypothesis u, v ⊲τ a for some value a. Hence su, tv ⊲µ fa. Thus
su ‖µ tv by the inductive hypothesis.
Lemma 7.4 (Admissibility). For every variable x : σ there is some a ∈ Dσ such that x ⊲ a.
In particular, Dσ is a nonempty set for every type σ.
Proof. Let x : σ be a variable. By Lemma 6.5 (2) we know x ‖σ x. Hence {x} is compatible.
By Lemma 7.3 there exists a value a such that x ⊲σ a. The claim follows since a ∈ Dσ by
definition of Dσ.
Lemma 7.5 (Functionality). If s ⊲σ a, t ⊲σ b, and (s=t) ∈ E , then a = b.
Proof. By contradiction and induction on σ. Assume s ⊲σ a, t ⊲σ b, (s=t) ∈ E, and a 6= b.
Case analysis.
σ = o. By Ebq either s, t ∈ E or ¬s,¬t ∈ E. Hence a and b are either both 1 or both 0.
Contradiction.
σ = α. Since a 6= b, there must be discriminating terms of type α. Since (s=t) ∈ E, we
know by N3 and Econ that s and t are normal and discriminating. Hence s ∈ a and t ∈ b.
Contradiction by Proposition 6.4 (2).
σ = τµ. Since a 6= b, there is some c ∈ Dτ such that ac 6= bc. By the definition of Dτ
and Lemma 3.1 there is a normal term u such that u ⊲τ c. Hence su ⊲ ac and tu ⊲ bc. By
Proposition 3.1 [su]⊲µac and [tu]⊲µbc. By Efq the equation [su] = [tu] is in E. Contradiction
by the inductive hypothesis.
We now define the canonical interpretations for the logical constants:
L(¬) := λa∈Do. if a=1 then 0 else 1
L(=σ) := λa∈Dσ. λb∈Dσ. if a=b then 1 else 0
Lemma 7.6 (Logical Constants). c ⊲ L(c) for every logical constant c.
Proof. We show ¬⊲L(¬) by contradiction. Let s⊲oa and assume ¬s ⋫ L(¬)a. Case analysis.
• a = 0. Then [s] /∈ E and ¬[¬s] ∈ E. Contradiction by N3 and E¬¬.
• a = 1. Then ¬[s] /∈ E and [¬s] ∈ E. Contradiction by N3.
Finally, we show (=σ) ⊲ L(=σ) by contradiction. Let s ⊲σ a, t ⊲σ b, and (s=σt) ⋫ L(=σ)ab.
Case analysis.
• a = b. Then [s]♯[t] by N3 and s, t ⊲ a. Thus s ‖ t by Lemma 7.3. Contradiction by
Lemma 6.5 (1).
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• a 6= b. Then ([s]=[t]) ∈ E by N3. Hence a = b by Proposition 3.1 and Lemma 7.5.
Contradiction.
Theorem 7.7 (Model Existence). Every evident branch is satisfiable. Moreover, every
complete evident branch has a surjective model, and every finite evident branch has a finite
model.
Proof. Let E be an evident branch and ⊲ be the value system for E. By Proposition 7.1,
Lemma 7.4, and Lemma 7.6 we have a logical interpretation I that is admissible for ⊲. By
Lemma 7.2 I is a model of E.
Let E be complete. By Theorem 3.4 we know that I is surjective if ⊲ is functional. Let
s ⊲β a and s ⊲β b. We show a = b. By Proposition 3.1 we can assume that s is normal. Thus
s=s is normal by N3. Since I is a model of E, we know that the formula s 6=s is not in E.
Since E is complete, we know that s=s is in E. By Lemma 7.5 we have a = b.
If E is finite, Iα = Dα is finite by Proposition 6.3.
8. Abstract Consistency
We now extend the model existence result for evident branches to abstract consistency
classes, following the corresponding development for first-order logic [25]. Notions of abstract
consistency for simple type theory have been previously considered in [2, 21, 22, 4, 9, 6, 7,
12, 13]. Equality was treated as Leibniz equality in [2]. Abstract consistency conditions
for primitive equality corresponding to reflexivity and substutivity properties were given by
Benzmüller in [4, 5]. A primitive identity predicate =σ was considered in [6] but the abstract
consistency conditions for =σ essentially reduced it to Leibniz equality. Conditions for =σ
analogous to Ccon first appeared in [12].
An abstract consistency class is a set Γ of branches such that every branch A ∈ Γ satisfies
the conditions in Figure 5. An abstract consistency class Γ is complete if for every branch
A ∈ Γ and every normal formula s either A ∪ {s} or A ∪ {¬s} is in Γ. The completeness
condition was called “saturation” in [6]. As discussed in [8] and the conclusion of [6], the
condition corresponds to having a cut rule in a calculus. In [7] conditions analogous to Cdec
and Cmat appear (using Leibniz equality) and a model existence theorem is proven with
these conditions replacing saturation. The use of Leibniz equality means that there was still
not a cut-free treatment of equality in [7].
Proposition 8.1. Let A be a branch. Then A is evident if and only if {A} is an abstract
consistency class. Moreover, A is a complete evident branch if and only if {A} is a complete
abstract consistency class.
Lemma 8.2 (Extension Lemma). Let Γ be an abstract consistency class and A ∈ Γ. Then
there exists an evident branch E such that A ⊆ E. Moreover, if Γ is complete, a complete
evident branch E exists such that A ⊆ E.
Proof. Let u0, u1, u2, . . . be an enumeration of all normal formulas. We construct a sequence
A0 ⊆ A1 ⊆ A2 ⊆ · · · of branches such that every An ∈ Γ. Let A0 := A. We define An+1
by cases. If there is no B ∈ Γ such that An ∪ {un} ⊆ B, then let An+1 := An. Otherwise,
choose some B ∈ Γ such that An ∪ {un} ⊆ B. We consider two subcases.
(1) If un is of the form s 6=στ t, then choose An+1 to be B ∪ {[sx] 6= [tx]} ∈ Γ for some
variable x. This is possible since Γ satisfies Cfe.
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C¬¬ If ¬¬s is in A, then A ∪ {s} is in Γ.
Cbq If s =o t is in A, then either A ∪ {s, t} or A ∪ {¬s,¬t} is in Γ.
Cbe If s 6=o t is in A, then either A ∪ {s,¬t} or A ∪ {¬s, t} is in Γ.
Cfq If s =στ t is in A,
then A ∪ {[su] 6= [tu]} is in Γ for every normal u : σ.
Cfe If s 6=στ t is in A, then A ∪ {[sx] 6= [tx]} is in Γ for some variable x.
Cmat If xs1 . . . sn is in A and ¬xt1 . . . tn is in A,
then n ≥ 1 and A ∪ {si 6= ti} is in Γ for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Cdec If xs1 . . . sn 6=α xt1 . . . tn is in A, then n ≥ 1 and A ∪ {si 6= ti} is in Γ
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Ccon If s =α t and u 6=α v are in A,
then either A ∪ {s 6= u, t 6= u} or A ∪ {s 6= v, t 6= v} is in Γ.
Figure 5: Abstract consistency conditions (must hold for every A ∈ Γ)
(2) If un is not of this form, then let An+1 be B.
Let E :=
⋃
n∈N
An. We show that E satisfies the evidence conditions.
E¬¬ Assume ¬¬s is in E. Let n be such that un = s. Let r ≥ n be such that ¬¬s is in
Ar. By C¬¬, Ar ∪ {s} ∈ Γ. Since An ∪ {s} ⊆ Ar ∪ {s}, we have s ∈ An+1 ⊆ E.
Emat Assume xs1 . . . sn and ¬xt1 . . . tn are in E. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let mi be such
that umi is si 6= ti. Let r ≥ m1, . . . ,mn be such that xs1 . . . sn and ¬xt1 . . . tn are in
Ar. By Cmat n ≥ 1 and there is some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Ar ∪ {si 6= ti} ∈ Γ.
Since Ami ∪ {si 6= ti} ⊆ Ar ∪ {si 6= ti}, we have (si 6= ti) ∈ Ami+1 ⊆ E.
Edec Similar to Emat
Econ Assume s =α t and u 6=α v are in E. Let n,m, j, k be such that un is s 6= u, um
is t 6= u, uj is s 6= v and uk is t 6= v. Let r ≥ n,m, j, k be such that s =α t and
u 6=α v are in Ar. By Ccon either Ar ∪ {s 6= u, t 6= u} or Ar ∪ {s 6= v, t 6= v} is in
Γ. Assume Ar ∪ {s 6= u, t 6= u} is in Γ. Since An ∪ {s 6= u} ⊆ Ar ∪ {s 6= u, t 6= u},
we have s 6= u ∈ An+1 ⊆ E. Since Am ∪ {t 6= u} ⊆ Ar ∪ {s 6= u, t 6= u}, we have
t 6= u ∈ Am+1 ⊆ E. Next assume Ar ∪ {s 6= v, t 6= v} is in Γ. By a similar argument
we know s 6= v and t 6= v must be in E.
Ebq Assume s =o t is in E. Let n,m, j, k be such that un = s, um = t, uj = ¬s and
uk = ¬t. Let r ≥ n,m, j, k be such that s =o t is in Ar. By Cbq either Ar ∪ {s, t} or
Ar∪{¬s,¬t} is in Γ. Assume Ar∪{s, t} is in Γ. Since An∪{s} ⊆ Ar ∪{s, t}, we have
s ∈ E. Since Am ∪ {t} ⊆ Ar ∪ {s, t}, we have t ∈ E. Next assume Ar ∪ {¬s,¬t} is in
Γ. Since Aj∪{¬s} ⊆ Ar∪{¬s,¬t}, we have ¬s ∈ E. Since Ak∪{¬t} ⊆ Ar∪{¬s,¬t},
we have ¬t ∈ E.
Ebe Similar to Ebq
Efq Assume s =στ t is in E and u : σ is normal. Let n be such that un is [su] =τ [tu].
Let r ≥ n be such that s =στ t is in Ar. By Cfq we know Ar ∪ {[su] =τ [tu]} is in Γ.
Hence [su] =τ [tu] is in An+1 and also in E.
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Efe Assume s 6=στ t is in E. Let n be such that un is s 6=στ t. Let r ≥ n be such that
s 6=στ t is in Ar. Since An∪{un} ⊆ Ar, there is some variable x such that [sx] 6=τ [tx]
is in An+1 ⊆ E.
It remains to show that E is complete if Γ is complete. Let Γ be complete and s be a normal
formula. We show that s or ¬s is in E. Let m, n be such that um = s and un = ¬s. We
consider m < n. (The case m > n is symmetric.) If s ∈ An, we have s ∈ E. If s /∈ An, then
An ∪{s} is not in Γ. Hence An ∪{¬s} is in Γ since Γ is complete. Hence ¬s ∈ An+1 ⊆ E.
Theorem 8.3 (Model Existence). Every member of an abstract consistency class has a
model, which is surjective if the consistency class is complete.
Proof. Let A ∈ Γ where Γ is an abstract consistency class. By Lemma 8.2 we have an
evident set E such that A ⊆ E, where E is complete if Γ is complete. The claim follows
with Theorem 7.7.
9. Completeness
It is now straightforward to prove the completeness of the tableau calculus T . Let ΓT
be the set of all finite branches that are not refutable.
Lemma 9.1. ΓT is an abstract consistency class.
Proof. We have to show that ΓT satisfies the abstract consistency conditions.
C¬¬ Assume ¬¬s is in A and A ∪ {s} /∈ ΓT . Then we can refute A using T¬¬.
Cmat Assume {xs1 . . . sn,¬xt1 . . . tn} ⊆ A and A ∪ {si 6= ti} /∈ ΓT for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Then we can refute A using Tmat.
Cdec Assume xs1 . . . sn 6=α xt1 . . . tn is in A and A ∪ {si 6= ti} /∈ ΓT for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Then we can refute A using Tdec.
Ccon Assume s =α t and u 6=α v are in A but A∪{s 6= u, t 6= u} and A∪{s 6= v, t 6= v} are
not in ΓT . Then we can refute A using Tcon.
Cbq Assume s =o t is in A, A∪ {s, t} /∈ ΓT and A∪ {¬s,¬t} /∈ ΓT . Then we can refute A
using Tbq.
Cbe Assume s 6=o t is in A, A∪ {s,¬t} /∈ ΓT and A∪ {¬s, t} /∈ ΓT . Then we can refute A
using Tbe.
Cfq Let (s =στ t) ∈ A ∈ ΓT . Suppose A ∪ {[su]=[tu]} /∈ ΓT for some normal u ∈ Λσ.
Then A ∪ {[su]=[tu]} is refutable and so A is refutable by Tfq.
Cfe Let (s 6=στ t) ∈ A ∈ ΓT . Suppose A ∪ {[sx]6=[tx]} /∈ ΓT for every variable x : σ. Then
A ∪ {[sx]6=[tx]} is refutable for every x : σ. Hence A is refutable using Tfe and the
finiteness of A. Contradiction.
Theorem 9.2 (Completeness). Every unsatisfiable finite branch is refutable.
Proof. By contradiction. Let A be an unsatisfiable finite branch that is not refutable. Then
A ∈ ΓT and hence A is satisfiable by Lemma 9.1 and Theorem 8.3. Contradiction.
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10. Compactness and Countable Models
It is known [18, 1] that simple type theory is compact and has the countable-model
property. We use the opportunity and show how these properties follow with the results we
already have. It is only for the existence of countable models that we make use of complete
evident sets and complete abstract consistency classes.
A branch A is sufficiently pure if for every type σ there are infinitely many variables of
type σ that do not occur free in the formulas of A. Let ΓC be the set of all sufficiently pure
branches A such that every finite subset of A is satisfiable. We write ⊆f for the finite subset
relation.
Lemma 10.1. Let A ∈ ΓC and B1, . . . , Bn be finite branches such that A ∪Bi /∈ ΓC for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then there exists a finite branch A′ ⊆f A such that A
′ ∪ Bi is unsatisfiable
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Proof. By the assumption, we have for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} a finite and unsatisfiable branch
Ci ⊆ A ∪Bi. The branch A
′ := (C1 ∪ · · · ∪Cn) ∩A satisfies the claim.
Lemma 10.2. ΓC is a complete abstract consistency class.
Proof. We verify the abstract consistency conditions using Lemma 10.1 tacitly.
C¬¬ Assume ¬¬s is in A and A ∪ {s} /∈ ΓC. There is some A
′ ⊆f A such that A
′ ∪ {s} is
unsatisfiable. There is a model of A′ ∪ {¬¬s} ⊆f A. This is also a model of A
′ ∪ {s},
contradicting our choice of A′.
Cmat Assume xs1 . . . sn and ¬xt1 . . . tn are in A and A ∪ {si 6= ti} /∈ ΓC for all i ∈
{1, . . . , n}. There is some A′ ⊆f A such that A
′ ∪ {si 6= ti} is unsatisfiable for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. There is a model I of A′ ∪ {xs1 . . . sn,¬xt1 . . . tn} ⊆f A. Since
Iˆ(xs1 . . . sn) 6= Iˆ(xt1 . . . tn), we must have Iˆ(si) 6= Iˆ(ti) for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n} (and
in particular n must not be 0). Thus I models A′∪{si 6= ti}, contradicting our choice
of A′.
Cdec Similar to Cmat
Ccon Assume s =α t and u 6=α v are in A, A ∪ {s 6= u, t 6= u} /∈ ΓC and A ∪ {s 6= v, t 6=
v} /∈ ΓC. There is some A
′ ⊆f A such that A
′ ∪ {s 6= u, t 6= u} and A′ ∪ {s 6= v, t 6= v}
are unsatisfiable. There is a model I of A′ ∪ {s = t, u 6= v} ⊆f A. Since Iˆ(s) = Iˆ(t)
and Iˆ(u) 6= Iˆ(v), we either have Iˆ(s) 6= Iˆ(u) and Iˆ(t) 6= Iˆ(u) or Iˆ(s) 6= Iˆ(v) and
Iˆ(t) 6= Iˆ(v). Hence I models either A′ ∪ {s 6= u, t 6= u} or A′ ∪ {s 6= v, t 6= v},
contradicting our choice of A′.
Cbq Assume s =o t is in A, A ∪ {s, t} /∈ ΓC and A ∪ {¬s,¬t} /∈ ΓC. There is some
A′ ⊆f A such that A
′ ∪ {s, t} and A′ ∪ {¬s,¬t} are unsatisfiable. There is a model of
A′ ∪ {s =o t} ⊆f A. This is also a model of A
′ ∪ {s, t} or A′ ∪ {¬s,¬t}.
Cbe Assume s 6=o t is in A, A ∪ {s,¬t} /∈ ΓC and A ∪ {¬s, t} /∈ ΓC. There is some
A′ ⊆f A such that A
′ ∪ {s,¬t} and A′ ∪ {¬s, t} are unsatisfiable. There is a model of
A′ ∪ {s 6=o t} ⊆f A. This is also a model of A
′ ∪ {s,¬t} or A′ ∪ {¬s, t}.
Cfq Assume s =στ t is in A but A ∪ {[su] =τ [tu]} is not in ΓC for some normal u ∈ Λσ.
There is some A′ ⊆f A such that A
′ ∪ {[su] = [tu]} is unsatisfiable. There is a model
I of A′ ∪ {s = t} ⊆f A. Since Iˆ(s) = Iˆ(t), we know Iˆ([su]) = Iˆ(su) = Iˆ(s)Iˆ(u) =
Iˆ(t)Iˆ(u) = Iˆ(tu) = Iˆ([tu]) using N4. Hence I is a model of A′ ∪ {[su] = [tu]}, a
contradiction.
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Cfe Assume s 6=στ t is in A. Since A is sufficiently pure, there is a variable x : σ which
does not occur in A. Assume A ∪ {[sx] 6= [tx]} /∈ ΓC. There is some A
′ ⊆f A such
that A′ ∪ {[sx] 6= [tx]} is unsatisfiable. There is a model I of A′ ∪ {s 6= t} ⊆f A.
Since Iˆ(s) 6= Iˆ(t), there must be some a ∈ Iσ such that Iˆ(s)a 6= Iˆ(t)a. Since
x does not occur free in A, we know Îxa (sx) 6= Î
x
a (tx) and I
x
a is a model of A
′.
Since Îxa ([sx]) = Î
x
a (sx) and Î
x
a ([tx]) = Î
x
a (tx) by N4, we conclude I
x
a is a model of
A′ ∪ {[sx] 6= [tx]}, contradicting our choice of A′.
We show the completeness of ΓC by contradiction. Let A ∈ ΓC and s be a normal formula
such that A∪{s} and A∪{¬s} are not in ΓC. Then there exists A
′ ⊆f A such that A
′ ∪{s}
and A′ ∪ {¬s} are unsatisfiable. Contradiction since A′ is satisfiable.
Theorem 10.3. Let A be a branch such that every finite subset of A is satisfiable. Then A
has a countable model.
Proof. Without loss of generality we assume A is sufficiently pure. Then A ∈ ΓC. Hence A
has a countable model by Lemma 10.2 and Theorem 8.3.
11. EFO Fragment
We now turn to the EFO fragment of STT as first reported in [14]. The EFO fragment
contains first-order logic and enjoys the usual properties of first-order logic. We will show
completeness and compactness with respect to standard models. We will also prove that
countable models for evident EFO sets exist.
Suppose STT were given with ¬, →, =σ and ∀σ. Then the natural definition of EFO
would restrict =σ and ∀σ to the case where σ is a base type. To avoid redundancy our
definition of EFO will also exclude the case where σ = o.
Our definition of EFO assumes the logical constants ¬ : oo, →: ooo, =α: ααo and
∀α : (αo)o where α ranges over sorts. We call these constants EFO constants. For an
assignment to be logical we require that it interprets the logical constants as usual. In
particular, I(∀α) must be the function returning 1 iff its argument is the constant 1 function.
We say a term is EFO if it only contains the logical constants ¬, →, =α and ∀α. Let
EFOσ be the set of EFO terms of type σ. A term is quasi-EFO if it is EFO or of the form
s 6=σ t where s, t are EFO and σ is a type. A branch E is EFO if every member of E is
quasi-EFO. The example tableau shown in Figure 2 only contains EFO branches.
The tableau rules in Figure 6 define a tableau calculus F for EFO branches up to
restrictions on applicability given in Section 14. After showing a model existence theorem,
we will precisely define the tableau calculus F and prove it is complete for EFO branches.
The completeness result will be with respect to standard models. For some fragments of
EFO the tableau calculus F will terminate, yielding decidability results.
12. EFO Evidence and Compatibility
We say an EFO branch E is evident if it satisfies the evidence conditions in Figure 4
and the following additional conditions.
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F¬¬
¬¬s
s
Fbe
s 6=o t
s , ¬t | ¬s , t
F→
s→ t
¬s | t
F¬→
¬(s→ t)
s , ¬t
Fmat
xs1 . . . sn , ¬xt1 . . . tn
s1 6= t1 | · · · | sn 6= tn
n ≥ 0 Fdec
xs1 . . . sn 6=α xt1 . . . tn
s1 6= t1 | · · · | sn 6= tn
n ≥ 0
Ffe
s 6=στ t
[sx] 6= [tx]
x : σ fresh Fcon
s =α t , u 6=α v
s 6= u , t 6= u | s 6= v , t 6= v
F∀
∀αs
[su]
u ∈ EFOα normal F¬∀
¬∀αs
¬[sx]
x : α fresh
Figure 6: Tableau rules for EFO
E→ If s→ t is in E, then ¬s or t is in E.
E¬→ If ¬(s→ t) is in E, then s and ¬t are in E.
E∀ If ∀αs is in E, then [su] is in E for every α-discriminating u in E.
E∅∀ If ∀αs is in E, then [su] is in E for some normal EFO term u : α.
E¬∀ If ¬∀αs is in E, then ¬[sx] is in E for some variable x.
We say an EFO branch E is EFO-complete if for all normal s ∈ EFOo either s ∈ E or
¬s ∈ E.
The condition E∀ is the usual condition for universal quantifiers with instantiations
restricted to α-discriminating terms. Since there may be no α-discriminating terms in E,
we also include the condition E∅∀ to ensure that at least one instantiation has been made.
Without the condition E∅∀ , the set {∀αx.¬(y → y)} would be evident.
Let E be an evident EFO branch. Compatibility can be defined exactly as in Section 6.2
and Lemma 6.5 holds. In the proof of Lemma 13.8 below, we will need to know that if E has
some α-discriminating term, then all α-discriminants are nonempty. Since α-discriminants
are maximal sets of α-discriminating terms, it is enough to prove every α-discriminating
term is compatible with itself. To be concrete, we must prove s 6=α s is never in E. One
way we could ensure this is to include it as an evidence condition and have a corresponding
tableau rule of the form:
F 6=
s 6=α s
This was the choice taken in [14]. One drawback to including the rule F6= in the ground
calculus is that a lifting lemma will be more difficult to show when one passes to a calculus
with variables.
Another alternative is to remove the restriction on instantiations in the rule F∀. If we do
not restrict F∀ to discriminating terms, then we can show the existence of a model without
knowing a priori that α-discriminants are nonempty in the presence of α-discriminating
terms.
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In order to obtain a strong completeness result, we will not follow either of these alter-
natives. Instead we prove that all terms are compatible with themselves. First we prove
EFO constants are compatible with themselves.
Lemma 12.1. For every EFO constant c, c ‖ c.
Proof. Case analysis. ¬ ‖ ¬ follows from N3 and E¬¬. →‖→ follows from N3, E→ and E¬→.
=α‖=α follows from N3 and Econ. We show ∀α ‖ ∀α. Let s ‖αo t be given. Assume ∀s ∦ ∀t.
Without loss of generality, assume [∀s] and ¬[∀t] are in E. By E¬∀ we have ¬[tx] in E for
some variable x : α. By E∅∀ we have [su] in E for some normal EFO term u. Since su ∦o tx,
we must have u ∦α x. In particular, x must be an α-discriminating term. By E∀ we have
[sx] is in E. Hence we must have x ∦α x, contradicting Lemma 6.5 (2).
Next we prove compatibility respects normalization.
Lemma 12.2. For all s, t : σ, s ‖σ t iff [s] ‖σ [t].
Proof. Induction on types. At base types this follows from N1 and the definition of compat-
ibility. Assume σ is τµ. Let u ‖τ v. By N2 and the inductive hypothesis (twice) we have
su ‖ tv iff [su] ‖ [tv] iff [[s]u] ‖ [[t]v] iff [s]u ‖ [t]v. Hence s ‖ t iff [s] ‖ [t].
For two substitutions θ and φ we write θ ‖ φ when Dom θ = Dom φ, θx ‖ φx for every
variable x ∈ Dom θ and θc ‖ φc for every EFO constant c ∈ Dom θ.
Lemma 12.3. For all s ∈ EFOσ, if θ ‖ φ, then θˆs ‖ φˆs.
Proof. By induction on s. Case analysis.
s is a variable or an EFO constant in Dom θ. The claim follows from θ ‖ φ and S1.
s is a variable not in Dom θ. The claim follows from S1 and Lemma 6.5 (2).
s is an EFO constant not in Dom θ. The claim follows from S1 and Lemma 12.1.
s = tu. By inductive hypothesis θˆt ‖ φˆt and θˆu ‖ φˆu. Hence θˆ(tu) ‖ φˆ(tu) using S2.
s = λx.t where x : σ. Let u ‖ v be given. We will prove (θˆs)u ‖ (φˆs)v. Using Lemma 12.2
and S3 it is enough to prove θ̂xut ‖ φ̂
x
vt. This is the inductive hypothesis with θ
x
u and φ
x
v .
Lemma 12.4. For all s ∈ EFOσ, s ‖ s.
Proof. By Lemma 12.3 we have ∅ˆs ‖ ∅ˆs. We conclude s ‖ s using Lemma 12.2 and S4.
We can now prove α-discriminants are nonempty if E has some α-discriminating term.
Lemma 12.5. If a is an α-discriminant and E has an α-discriminating term, then a is
nonempty.
Proof. Let s be α-discriminating. We know s ‖ s by Lemma 12.4 and so {s} is compatible.
If a is empty, then a ∪ {s} is compatible, contradicting maximality of a.
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13. EFO Model Construction
Let E be an evident EFO branch. We inductively define a standard frame D.
Do = {0, 1}
Dα = {a|a is an α-discriminant}
D(στ) = Dσ → Dτ
We define a value system ⊲ as for STT, but extend it to higher types using full function
spaces.
s ⊲o 0 :⇐⇒ s ∈ Λo and [s] /∈ E
s ⊲o 1 :⇐⇒ s ∈ Λo and ¬[s] /∈ E
s ⊲α a :⇐⇒ s ∈ Λα, a is an α-discriminant, and [s] ∈ a if [s] is discriminating
⊲στ := { (s, f) ∈ Λστ × (Dσ → Dτ) | ∀(t, a) ∈ ⊲σ : (st, fa) ∈ ⊲τ }
In spite of the slightly different construction, many of the previous results still hold with
essentially the same proofs as before.
Proposition 13.1. s ⊲σ a iff [s] ⊲σ a.
Proof. Similar to Proposition 3.1.
Lemma 13.2. Let I be an assignment into D such that x ⊲ Ix for all names x and θ be
a substitution such that θx ⊲ Ix for all x ∈ Dom θ. Then s ∈ Dom Iˆ and θˆs ⊲ Iˆs for every
term s.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 3.3
Theorem 13.3. Let I be an assignment into D such that x ⊲ Ix for all names x. Then I
is an interpretation such that s ⊲ Iˆs for all terms s.
Proof. Follows from Proposition 13.1, Lemma 13.2 and property S4.
Lemma 13.4. A logical assignment I is a model of E if x ⊲ Ix for every name x.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 7.2 using Theorem 13.3.
Lemma 13.5 (Common Value). Let T ⊆ Λσ. Then T is compatible if and only if there
exists a value a such that T ⊲σ a.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 7.3.
Lemma 13.6 (Admissibility). For every variable x : σ there is some a ∈ Dσ such that x⊲a.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 7.4 using Lemma 6.5 and Lemma 13.5.
Lemma 13.7 (Functionality). If s ⊲α a, t ⊲α b, and (s=t) ∈ E , then a = b.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 7.5 restricted only to sorts.
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As before L(c) is the canonical interpretation for each logical constant c. We now have
the additional logical constants → and ∀α:
L(→) := λa∈Do. λb∈Do. if a=1 then b else 1
L(∀α) := λf∈Dα→ Do. if f = (λx ∈ Dα. 1) then 1 else 0
Lemma 13.8 (Logical Constants). c ⊲ L(c) for every logical constant c.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 7.6. The proof for ¬ is the same. The proof for → uses N3,
E→ and E¬→. The proof for =σ requires a slight modification. Assume s ⊲σ a, t ⊲σ b, and
(s=σt) ⋫ L(=σ)ab. Case analysis.
• a = b. Use Lemmas 13.5 and 6.5 (1).
• a 6= b. Then ([s]=[t]) ∈ E and so σ must be a sort α since E is EFO. This contradicts
Lemma 13.7.
Finally, we prove ∀α ⊲ L(∀α). Case analysis. Assume s ⊲αo f and ∀αs ⋫o L(∀α)f .
• L(∀α)f = 1. Then ¬[∀αs] ∈ E and so by N3, E¬∀ and N2 we have ¬[sx] ∈ E for some
variable x : α. We know {x} is compatible by Lemma 6.5 (2) and so by Lemma 13.5 there
is some a ∈ Dα such that x ⊲ a. Thus sx ⊲ 1, contradicting ¬[sx] ∈ E.
• L(∀α)f = 0. Then [∀αs] ∈ E and there is some a ∈ Dα such that fa = 0. Suppose there
are no α-discriminating terms. In this case a is empty and u ⊲ a for any u ∈ Λα. By N3,
E∅∀ and N2 we have [su] ∈ E for some normal EFO term u. Hence su ⋫ 0, contradicting
s ⊲ f and u ⊲ a. Next suppose there are α-discriminating terms. In this case there is some
u ∈ a by Lemma 12.5. By N3, E∀ and N2 we know [su] ∈ E. In this case we also have
su ⋫ 0, again contradicting s ⊲ f and u ⊲ a.
Theorem 13.9 (EFO Model Existence). Every evident EFO branch has a standard model.
Every EFO-complete evident EFO branch has a standard model where each Dα is countable.
Every finite evident EFO branch has a finite standard model.
Proof. We use the frame D and relation ⊲ defined above. We give an assignment I into D.
For each variable x we can choose Ix such that x ⊲ Ix using Lemma 13.6. For each logical
constant c we choose Ic = L(c). By Lemma 13.8 we know c ⊲ Ic. I is a model of E by
Lemma 13.4.
Suppose E is EFO-complete. We prove there are only countably many α-discriminants
as follows. If there are no α-discriminating terms, then ∅ is the only α-discriminant. Other-
wise, every α-discriminant is nonempty by Lemma 12.5. For each α-discriminant a, choose
some sa ∈ a. We prove the function mapping a to sa is injective. Assume a, b ∈ Dα and
a 6= b. By EFO-completeness of E and Proposition 6.4 we must have sa 6= sb ∈ E. If sa and
sb were the same term, then E would be unsatisfiable. Hence sa and sb are different terms.
Finally, if E is finite, then for each sort α there will be only finitely many α-discriminants
(by Proposition 6.3) and hence Dσ will be finite for all σ.
14. EFO Completeness
Let F be the tableau calculus given by taking all the rules from Figure 6 subject to the
following restrictions.
• If (s 6=t) is on a branch A, then Ffe can only be applied if there is no variable x such that
([sx] 6= [tx]) ∈ A.
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• If ¬∀αs is on a branch A, then F¬∀ can only be applied if there is no variable x : α such
that ¬[sx] ∈ A.
• If ∀αs is on a branch A and there are α-discriminating terms in A, then F∀ can only be
applied with these α-discriminating terms.
• If ∀αs is on a branch A, [su] /∈ A for all normal u ∈ Λα, some variable x : α occurs free
in A and there are no α-discriminating terms in A, then F∀ can only be applied with a
variable x : α occurring free in A.
• If ∀αs is on a branch A, [su] /∈ A for all normal u ∈ Λα, no variable x : α occurs free in A
and there are no α-discriminating terms in A, then F∀ can only be applied with a variable
x : α.
The idea behind the restrictions on F∀ is that only α-discriminating terms should be used
as instantiations, except when there are no α-discriminating terms. In case there are no
α-discriminating terms, at most one new variable x : α will be used as an instantiation term
for each sort α. These restrictions will ensure that F terminates when given branches in
certain fragments of EFO.
From now on we use the term refutable to refer to refutability in the calculus F . That
is, the set of refutable branches is the least set such that if A/A1 . . . An is an instance of a
rule of F and A1, . . . , An are refutable, then A is refutable. The proof of soundness of T
(see Proposition 5.1) extends to show soundness of F .
Proposition 14.1 (Soundness of F). Every refutable branch is unsatisfiable.
An EFO abstract consistency class is a set Γ of EFO branches such that every branch
A ∈ Γ satisfies the conditions in Figure 5 and also the following conditions:
C→ If s→ t is in A, then A ∪ {¬s} or A ∪ {t} is in Γ.
C¬→ If ¬(s→ t) is in A, then A ∪ {s,¬t} is in Γ.
C∀ If ∀αs is in A, then A ∪ {[su]} is in Γ for every α-discriminating u in A.
C∅∀ If ∀αs is in A, then A ∪ {[su]} is in Γ for some normal EFO term
u ∈ Λα.
C¬∀ If ¬∀αs is in A, then A ∪ {¬[sx]} is in Γ for some variable x.
We say an abstract consistency class Γ is EFO-complete if for all A ∈ Γ and all normal
s ∈ EFOo either A ∪ {s} ∈ Γ or A ∪ {¬s} ∈ Γ.
Let ΓEFOF be the set of all finite EFO branches that are not refutable.
Lemma 14.2. ΓEFOF is an abstract consistency class.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 9.1. We only check the new conditions: C→, C¬→, C∀, C
∅
∀ and C¬∀.
C→ Let s → t ∈ A ∈ Γ
EFO
F . Suppose A ∪ {¬s} /∈ Γ
EFO
F and A ∪ {t} /∈ Γ
EFO
F . By F→ we
have A is refutable. Contradiction.
C¬→ If ¬(s→ t) ∈ A and A ∪ {s,¬t} /∈ Γ
EFO
F , then A /∈ Γ
EFO
F using the rule F¬→.
C∀ Let ∀αs ∈ A ∈ Γ
EFO
F . Suppose A ∪ {[su]} /∈ ΓT for some normal α-discriminating u.
Then A∪ {[su]} is refutable. Hence A can be refuted using F∀ (with the restriction).
C∅∀ Let ∀αs ∈ A ∈ Γ
EFO
F . If there is some α-discriminating term, then C
∅
∀ follows from
C∀. Assume there are no α-discriminating terms and A ∪ {[su]} /∈ ΓT for all normal
u ∈ EFOα. In particular, [su] /∈ A for all normal u ∈ EFOα. Choose a variable
x : α occurring free in A (or any variable x : α if none occurs free in A). Since
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A∪{[sx]} /∈ ΓT , A∪{[sx]} is refutable. Using F∀ (with the restriction), A is refutable.
Contradiction.
C¬∀ Let ¬∀αs ∈ A ∈ Γ
EFO
F . Suppose A ∪ {¬[sx]} /∈ ΓT for every variable x : α. Let x : α
be fresh for A. Then A ∪ {¬[sx]} is refutable and so A can be refuted using F¬∀.
Lemma 14.3 (EFO Extension Lemma). Let Γ be an abstract consistency class and A ∈ Γ
be an EFO branch. Then there exists an evident EFO branch E such that A ⊆ E. Moreover,
if Γ is EFO-complete, a EFO-complete evident EFO branch E exists such that A ⊆ E.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 8.2. Instead of using an enumeration of all normal formulas, we
use an enumeration of all normal EFO formulas. The proof goes through when one makes
some obvious modifications.
Theorem 14.4 (EFO Completeness). Every finite EFO branch is either refutable or has a
standard model.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 14.2, Lemma 14.3 and Theorem 13.9.
We now turn to compactness and the existence of countable models. Let ΓEFO
C
be the
set of all sufficiently pure EFO branches A such that every finite subset of A has a standard
model.
Lemma 14.5. ΓEFO
C
is an EFO-complete abstract consistency class.
Proof. Similar to Lemma 10.2.
Theorem 14.6. Let A be a branch such that every finite subset of A has a standard model.
Then A has a standard model where Dα is countable for all sorts α.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 10.3.
Corollary 14.7. Let A be a satisfiable EFO branch. Then A has a standard model where
Dα is countable for all sorts α.
Proof. To apply Theorem 14.6 we only need to show every subset of A has a standard model.
Let A′ be a finite subset of A. Since A′ is satisfiable, A′ is not refutable by Proposition 14.1.
By Theorem 14.4 A′ has a standard model.
15. Decidable EFO Fragments
Given the completeness result for the tableau calculus F (Theorem 14.4), we can show
a fragment of EFO is decidable by proving F terminates on branches in the fragment. We
will use this technique to argue decidability of three fragments:
• The λ-free fragment, which is EFO without λ-abstraction.
• The pure fragment, which consists of disequations s 6= t where no name used in s and t
has a type that contains o.
• The BSR fragment (Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey), which consists of relational first-order
∃∗∀∗-formulas with equality.
Proposition 15.1 (Verification Soundness). Let A be a finite EFO branch that is not closed
and cannot be extended with F . Then A is evident and has a finite model.
Proof. Checking A is evident is easy. The existence of a finite model follows from Theo-
rem 13.9.
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We now have a general method for proving decidability of satisfiability within a fragment.
Proposition 15.2. Let F terminate on a set ∆ of finite EFO branches. Then satisfiability
of the branches in ∆ is decidable and every satisfiable branch in ∆ has a finite model.
Proof. Follows with Propositions 14.1 and 15.1 and Theorem 13.9.
The decision procedure depends on the normalization operator employed with F . A
normalization operator that yields β-normal forms provides for all termination results proven
in this section. Note that the tableau calculus applies the normalization operator only to
applications st where s and t are both normal and t has type α (for some sort α) if it is not a
variable. Hence at most one β-reduction is needed for normalization if s and t are β-normal.
Moreover, no α-renaming is needed if the bound variables are chosen differently from the
free variables. For clarity, we continue to work with an abstract normalization operator and
state further conditions as they are needed.
15.1. Lambda-Free Formulas. In [15] we study lambda- and quantifier-free EFO and
show that the concomitant subsystem of F terminates on finite branches. The result extends
to lambda-free branches containing quantifiers (e.g., {∀αf}).
Proposition 15.3 (Lambda-Free Termination). Let the normalization operator satisfy
[s] = s for every lambda-free EFO term s. Then F terminates on finite lambda-free branches.
Proof. An application of Ffe disables a disequation s 6=στ t and introduces new subterms as
follows: a variable x : σ, two terms sx : τ and tx : τ , and the formula sx 6=tx. The types of
the new subterms are smaller than the type of s and t, and the new subterms introduced
by the other rules always have type o or α. For each branch, consider the multiset of types
στ where s, t : στ are subterms of formulas on the branch but there is no x : σ such that
sx 6= tx is on the branch. By considering the multiset ordering, we see that no derivation
can employ Ffe infinitely often.
Let A → A1 → A2 → · · · be a possibly infinite derivation that issues from a finite
lambda-free branch and does not employ Ffe. It suffices to show that the derivation is
finite. Consider the new variables x : α which may be introduced by the F∀ and F¬∀ rules.
For each subterm ∀αs at most one new variable will be introduced by these rules. Since
the branches are λ-free, no rule creates new subterms of the form ∀αs. Hence only finitely
many new variables of type α are introduced. Let An be a branch in the sequence such that
no new variables are introduced after this point. Let Sσ be the set of all subterms of type
σ of the formulas in An. Let B be the union of the three finite sets So, {¬s|s ∈ So} and
{s 6=σ t|s, t ∈ Sσ}. Every branch Am with m ≥ n can only contain members of B. Hence
the derivation is finite.
15.2. Pure Disequations. A type is pure if it does not contain o. A term is pure if the
type of every name occurring in it (bound or unbound) is pure. An equation s = t or
disequation s 6= t is pure if s and t are pure terms.
We add a new property of normalization in order to prove termination.
N5: The least relation ≻ on terms such that
(1) as1 . . . sn ≻ si if i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
(2) s ≻ [sx] if s : στ and x : σ
terminates on normal terms.
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Proposition 15.4 (Pure Termination). Let the normalization operator satisfy N5. Then F
terminates on finite branches containing only pure disequations.
Proof. Let A → A1 → A2 → · · · be a possibly infinite derivation that issues from a finite
branch containing only pure disequations. Then no other rules but possibly Fdec and Ffe
apply and thus no Ai contains a formula that is not a pure disequation (using S5). Using
N5 it follows that the derivation is finite.
15.3. Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey Formulas. It is well-known that the satisfiability
of Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey formulas (relational first-order ∃∗∀∗-prenex formulas with
equality) is decidable and the fragment has the finite model property [11]. We reobtain this
result by showing that F terminates for the respective fragment. We call a type BSR if
it is α or o or has the form α1 . . . αno. We call an EFO formula s BSR if it satisfies two
conditions:
(1) The type of every variable that occurs in s is BSR.
(2) ∀α does not occur below a negation or an implication in s.
Note that every subterm of a BSR formula that has type α is a variable. For simplicity, our
BSR formulas don’t provide for outer existential quantification. We need one more condition
for the normalization operator:
N6: If s : αo is BSR and x : α, then [sx] is BSR.
Proposition 15.5 (BSR Termination). Let the normalization operator satisfy N5 and N6.
Then F terminates on finite branches containing only BSR formulas.
Proof. Let A → A1 → A2 → · · · be a possibly infinite derivation that issues from a finite
branch containing only BSR formulas. Then F¬∀ and Ffe are not applicable and all Ai
contain only BSR formulas (using N6). Furthermore, for each sort α used in A at most one
new variable of sort α is introduced (by the restriction on F∀ in F). Since all terms of sort α
are variables, there is only a finite supply. Using N5 it follows that the derivation is finite.
16. Conclusion
In this paper we have studied a complete cut-free tableau calculus for simple type theory
with primitive equality (STT). For the first-order fragment of STT (EFO) we have shown
that the tableau system is complete with respect to standard models. Our development
demonstrates that first-order logic can be treated naturally as a fragment of STT.
For the EFO fragment we gave an interesting restriction on instantiations. In particular,
one can restrict most instantiations of sort α to be α-discriminating terms. Such a restric-
tion can also be included in the tableau calculus for STT without sacrificing completeness.
Confining instantiations to α-discriminating terms is a serious restriction since each branch
has only finitely many such terms.
Automated theorem proving would be a natural application of the tableau calculi pre-
sented here. When designing a search procedure one often starts with a complete ground
calculus (like our tableau calculi T and F), then extends this to include metavariables to
be instantiated during search, and finally proves a lifting lemma showing the tableaux with
metavariables can simulate a refutation in the ground calculus. A design principle of our
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calculi T and F is that none of the rules look deeply into the structure of any formula on
the branch. For example, consider the mating rule
xs1 . . . sn , ¬xt1 . . . tn
s1 6= t1 | · · · | sn 6= tn
n ≥ 0
To check if this rule applies to two formulas s, t on the branch A, one only needs to check if
s has a variable x at the head and if t is the negation of a formula with x at the head. When
trying to prove a lifting lemma, we would need to show how the calculus with metavariables
could simulate the mating rule. This may involve partially instantiating metavariables to
expose the head x in the counterpart to s or the negation and the head x in the counterpart
to t. On the other hand, suppose our ground calculus included a rule to close branches with
a formula of the form s 6= s. To simulate this in the calculus with metavariables we would
need to know if some instantiation for the metavariables can yield a formula of the form
s 6= s. In the worst case this is a problem requiring full higher-order unification. We have
been careful to only include rules in our calculi which will not require arbitrary instantiations
of metavariables to prove a lifting lemma. Formulating such a calculus with metavariables
and proving such a lifting lemma is left for future work.
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